Does distance still matter? Geographical dispersion within venture capital syndicates and IPO earnings management in China

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

6-1-2026

Abstract

While venture capital (VC) investors are expected to serve as effective monitors during the IPO process, geographical dispersion among syndicate members introduces logistical barriers to collective governance. Using a sample of 954 Chinese VC-backed IPO firms from 2008 to 2019, we examine how geographical dispersion within VC syndicates affects IPO earnings management. Syndicate-level geographical dispersion is measured using a metric derived from the travelling salesman problem. We find that greater intra-syndicate geographical dispersion increases IPO earnings management. This effect is attenuated by relational closeness among syndicate members but remains unaffected by improvements in broadband networks under the staggered rollout of the Broadband China policy. Heterogeneity analyses further reveal that the effect of geographical dispersion is more pronounced in smaller, less diverse VC syndicates and in firms subject to weaker external monitoring. This study highlights that while broadband networks enhance the transmission of hard information, they cannot substitute for relational governance in distant collaborative investments, where soft information exchange is essential for collective governance.

Keywords

Broadband networks, China, Geographical dispersion, Governance frictions, IPO earnings management, Relational governance, Venture capital syndicates

Publication Title

Finance Research Letters

ISSN

1544-6123

DOI

10.1016/j.frl.2026.109896

Volume

98

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