Strategic dynamics of crisis stability in South Asia
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
11-1-2022
Abstract
In contrast to the pervasive confidence that the development of nuclear weapons ensures peace and stability by making wars too expensive to fight for, South Asian strategic stability has drifted into nasty security competition through arms race with an episodical crisis that continues at the sub-conventional level. Deterrence studies that were relegated to the bins of history soon after the end of the Cold War received a renewed interest of scholars on the subject since the demonstration of deterrent capabilities by South Asian rivals in 1998. A new wave of deterrence studies has developed in the current multipolar world with some scholars adopting Cold War models of analysis in the contemporary realms of South Asia, whereas other are attempting new analytical approaches. This article aims to offer a fresh look at how to provide a clear concept of strategic stability, how strategic stability is applicable in contemporary South Asia and what the recent crisis between India and Pakistan being interwoven with terrorism tells us about crisis stability between the two countries under the shadows of nuclear weapons.
Keywords
Deterrence, Nuclear weapons, Strategic stability, Crisis stability, Stability-instability paradox
Divisions
International
Funders
Institute of Research Management & Services (IPPP), University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,Karakoram International University, Gilgit, Pakistan
Publication Title
Journal of Asian and African Studies
Volume
57
Issue
7
Publisher
SAGE Publications
Publisher Location
2455 TELLER RD, THOUSAND OAKS, CA 91320 USA