Document Type
Conference Item
Publication Date
6-1-2012
Abstract
Ownership structure is important in determining a company’s objective, increasing shareholders’ wealth and discipline of managers. In other words, ownership structure and the separation of ownership and control is the heart of corporate governance area. This paper looks into Executive Stock Option (ESO) granting of Malaysian non-financial companies as a corporate governance mechanism designed to reduce agency problem, thereby increasing firm value. The period of study covers from 2002 until 2008 to test the effects of ESO granting on firm performance while considering both market and accounting based performance measurements. Both univariate and multivariate panel data fixed effect regression models revealed a significant positive relationship between ESO granted and value of the firm for the years next to the years of ESO granting occurrences.
Divisions
Finance_and_Banking
Event Title
2nd International Conference On Management (2nd ICM 2012) Proceeding
Event Location
Langkawi, Kedah
Event Dates
11-12 June 2012
Event Type
conference
Additional Information
Agency problem, Executive stock option granting, Ownership structure, Panel data analysis, Return on assets, Tobin’s q